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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH FREIGHT LINES and 
EASTERN UTAH TRANSPOR-
TATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs (Appellants), 
vs. 
~-~ . ' 
~, PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
~!it. OF UTAH, and ASHTON'S·, 
l INCORPORATED, 
Defendants (Respondents). 
DEFENDANTS' (RESPOND·ENTS') BRIEF 
L. C. MONTGOMERY and 
SKEEN, THURMAN & 
WORSLEY, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
( Resp·ondent), 
Ashton's, Incorporated. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General, 
and 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
( Resp1ondent), 
Public Service Commission. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
UIXTAH FREIGHT LIXES and \ 
EASTERN UTAH TRANSPOR-
T~\TION CO~IP.A_NY, 
Pla-intiffs (Appellants), · 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COlVIlVIISSION 
OF UTAH, and ASHTON'S, 
I~ CORPORA TED, 
\ CAsE No. 7429 
Defendants (Respondents). J 
DEFENDANTS' (RESPONDENTS'). BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The opposition (appellants), in their brief, have 
designated themselves as "plaintiffs", and the Public 
Service Commission and Ashton'.s Inc. (respondents), 
as ''defendants.'' In order to avoid confusion, respond-
ents, in their brief, will use the same designations. 
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2 
Plaintiffs' statement of facts, except for a few 
inaccuracies and inadequacies, is substantially correct 
rand sufficient for a review of the action of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah in granting defendant, 
Ashton's, Incorporated, a corporation, a contract motor 
carrier permit, against the protest of the two named 
plaintiffs in this proceeding. 
At the outset of their brief, plaintiffs state that 
they obtained :a writ of certiorari to review the action 
of the Public Service Commission in granting the con-
tract motor carrier ~permit involved herein, over the 
objections of plaintiffs and others. But the writ, it will 
be noted, was applied for by and in behalf of, and was 
granted to, the Uintah Freight Lines and Eastern Utah 
Tr:a,nsportation Company only. None of the other pro-
testants joined in, or was a party to, plaintiffs' petition, 
or was included in the writ granted plaintiffs by this 
court. ( R. 119-121 ; 122.) Hence, any reference to the 
oth'er protestants, including Ashworth Transfer Conl-
pany, a partnership, and Salt Lake Transfer Comp.any, 
a p~artnership (who, at one stage of the instant proceed-
ings, objected to the granting of the application involved 
herein, were also protestants), or to the stipulation 
entered into that those two partnerships were (to quote 
from page 4 of plaintiffs' brief) "common carriers with 
operating authority and adequate equipment at all times 
to transport required commodities, including cement, 
between Devil 's Slide and Heber City, Roosevelt, and 
Vernal, Utah,'' is wholly i:m:ma terial to the issue now 
before this Court. Neither they nor 'any other protest-
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ants, except only Uintah Freight Lines and Eastern 
Utah Transportation Comp'any, now complain of the 
granting of the contract Inotor carrier permit under 
consideration. 
On pa_ge 5 of their brief, counsel, presu1nably with 
the intention of sho~ing gener!ally the nature and scope 
of the mercantile interests of the Ashton family in Heber 
City and the Uintah Basin, quote 'part of one paragraph 
(without indicating its incompleteness) and the 'vhole 
of another paragraph of the findings of the Public 
Service Commission herein. ( R. 105.) The language 
quoted, how·ever, is too limited to adequately reflect the 
full nature and scope of the Ashton interests and their 
methods of transporting merchandise into eastern Utah, 
and particularly the Uintah Basin, one of the largest 
areas located in any of the western states not served 
by rail. Accordingly, for the convenience of all con-
cerned, we again quote from the Commission's findings 
the whole of the language quoted by the op~position 
(which language we italicize), and also the language 
immediately preceding, as far back as the last par~graph 
on page 103 ( Co1r1mission 's Findings, R. 103-105) : 
"That the said Mrs. Leslie Ashton is the sur-
viving wife of Leslie Ashton, deceased, and that 
she and said deceased are the mother 'and father, 
respectively, of the said Clarence L. Ashton, Rae 
Ashton and Lowe Ashton; that in about the 
year 1898, said deceased as an individual, estab-
lished a mercantile business in Vern1al, Utah, and 
continued to operate said business, as an indi-
vidual or as a partnership with one or more of 
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4 
his said sons, until the time of deceased's death 
in about the year 1930, and, in said operations, 
said deceased and his said sons also established 
mercantile stores in Roosevelt and Heber City, and 
a gasoline service station in Vernal, Utah; that 
between the time of the death of said deceased, 
in about the year 1930, and the year 1943, said 
mercantile stores and said gasoline service sta-
tion were owned and operated by said three 
sons and the said Mrs. Leslie Ashton, as partner-
ships or as corporations; that in the- year 1943 
said joint holdings were partitioned between S!aid 
individuals, said mercantile store in Vernal being 
taken over by the said Rae Ashton, said gasoline 
service station in Vernal, by said individuals, 
in equal shares, S1aid mercantile store in Roose-
velt, by the said Clarence L. Ashton, and said 
mercantile store in Heber City, by the said 
Lowe Ashton. That no carrier service was avail-
able during all the period of the early growth 
and development of these enterprises. · 
'' Th!a.t at all times since the establishment of 
said mercantile business in Vernal, Utah, by 
the said Leslie Ashton, in about the year 1898, 
and the subsequent establishment of the mercan-
tile stores in Roosevelt and Heber City, and the 
·· :gasoline service station in Vernal, Utah, by said 
dece1a.sed and members of his immediate family, 
said deceased or one or more of his said three 
sons, as individuals, or as p.artnerships, or as 
corporations, by means of a team and wagon, 
or by motor vehicle, have hauled, and 1a.pplicant 
is now hauling, from points outside of the Uintah 
Basin and· Heber City to Heber City, Roosevelt 
and Vernal, Utah~ practically the whole of the 
merchandise· and commodities sold and handled 
· at s1aid Ashton mercantile stores, located at Heber 
City, ·Roosevelt and Vernal, Utah, and at said 
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gasoline service station located at Vernal, Utah, 
and that none of the protestants in this case h1as 
ever hauled, ·or is now hauling, any of said 
n1erchandise or con1modi ties, . except in very 
small and ·minor quantities. That the business 
·practices and success of the various Ashton enter-
prises have been est'ablished under this method. 
That applica~~t _proposes to perform said con.-
tract motor carrier service in substantially· the 
san~e manner and to the sa,me extent, and for 
the same interested p;arties located in Roosevelt 
amd Vernal, as said service has been pe·rformed, 
and is now being performed, by applicant and 
other members of the Ashton family, as individ-
uals, or as partnerships or corporations wholly 
·owned by members of said family, during the 
past fifty year$. That -even now, :despite the vari-
ous corporate interests, these Ashton mercantile 
· stores are operated_ more or less as one large 
enterp,rise -purchase jointly, advertise jointly, 
and ship by railroad and motor vehicle jointly. 
''That there is no evidence of willfu-l intent 
to violate the law during the many years that 
Leslie Ashton, deceased, or one or more of his 
said three sons, as individuals, or as partnership-s, 
or as corporations, have transported merchandise 
from Salt Lake City to Heber City, Roosevelt and 
Vernal, Utah, serving the Ashton mercantile 
stores and gasoline service station, located in 
said cities, and the commission has treated the 
operations as private hauls.'' 
ARGUMENT 
The three points relied upon by rp.Iaintiffs as error, 
will be discussed in the order in which they are con-
sidered in plain tiffs' brief. (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 8.) 
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POINT I. 
ALL THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THE ADEQUACY 
ANP REASONABLENESS OF EXISTING SERVICE. 
As stated by plaintiffs (p. 6, their brief), the Com-
mission, in its report herein, found (R. 108): 
"that existing transportation facilities do not 
provide adequate or rea~onable service to meet 
the requirements of the three shippers (Leslie 
Ashton & Sons in Roosevelt, Utah, Ashton Oil 
& Gas Company and Ashton- Brothers Company 
in Vernal, Ut,ah) for which applicant proposes 
to serve as a con tract carrier,'' 
and, presumably, supported such general finding by 
the three specific findings quoted on pages 6, 7 and 8 of 
plaintiffs' brief, and found in the Record herein· at 
pages 106 :and 107. 
It is interesting to note that 'Plaintiffs did not 
attack, or make any complaint whatsoever against, the 
three specific findings made by the Commission; nor 
did they point to a single word or line of the three 
specific findings as not being supported by the evidence 
introduced at the hearing before the Commission. Plain-
tiffs contented themselves with bre:aking ,up Point I 
into three categories, identifying them as _(a), (b) and 
(c), and considering them sep~arately, each category 
with extreme brevity. We earnestly assert that within 
the first two of the three findings, quoted in plaintiffs' 
brief, sufficient facts are found, affirmatively estab-
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7 
lishing that the service rendered and made available 
by plaintiffs to the three shippers (\Yhich service did 
not include the hauling of ceinent from Devil's Slide 
to Roosevelt and 'Ternal) 'vas not reasonably 'adequate 
to meet the shippers' requirements. It '\vould indeed 
have been an easy matter for ·p.Iaintiffs to have pointed 
out any finding not supported by the evidence, had 
there been no evidence to support such finding. 
For the convenience of the Court, we quote the 
first two of the three findings in question, omitting the 
third finding which deals wholly '\vith the hauling of 
cement from Devil's Slide, a point not served by either 
of the two plaintiffs and not an issue in this p·roceeding: 
"That applicant, in the conduct of its general 
hard"'""are store and lumber yard at Heber City, 
maintains a warehouse, and keeps. on hand there-
in quantities of hardware, and cement, lumber 
and other building materials, sufficient to meet 
its own needs, and the eme_rgency demands made 
by customers upon said three shippers, located 
at Roosevelt and Vernal; that said emergency 
demands frequently arise and are phoned in to 
applicant by said shippers, and that 'ap:plicant 
is able to and does transport to said Roosevelt 
and Vernal, within a matter of three to four 
hours, the merchandise necessary to meet said 
emergency demands. 
''That said two Ashton mercantile shippers, 
located at Roosevelt and Vernal, sell large quan-
tities of fresh meats, fruits and vegetables, which 
are highly perishable; that applicant, in the 
transportation of said commodities from S:alt 
Lake City to Roosevelt and Vernal, has made, 
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and is now __ making, three trips weekly, leaving 
Salt Lake City in mid afternoon, and arriving 
in Heber City in the early evening, 1and in Roose-
velt and Vernal at a·pproximately 8 and 9 o'clock 
P.M., respectively, on the same day; that upon 
arriving at destination, applicant unloads said 
merchandise and places the same after business 
~ours, in refrigerators and coolers located in 
the stores of said two Ashton mercantile shippers, 
and- that by such means said merchandise is ade~ 
quately preserved and can be made ready for 
display :and sale at ·the time of the opening of 
the stores on the following morning. This prac~ 
tice has continued for a long period, and the 
business methods of the parties have been built 
upon this system.'' 
(a) 
In the first category considered, identified as (a), 
it is asserted that no authority was needed from the 
Public Service Commission for applicant to haul hard-
ware, cement, lumber and other materials to Roosevelt 
and Vernal, Utah, from applicant's yard at Heber City, 
and this for the reason that when making such hauls, 
applicant was moving its own merchandise. That very 
issue, plaintiffs state on ·page 11 of their brief, was 
argued by their counsel during the progress of the 
he:aring. They quoted the following language of coun-
sel, found in the Record at page 629: 
- ·.'' * * * If Ashton's, Inc., as witness is testify-
- ing (referring to testimony of C. L. Ashton) is 
a distributor of merchandise and is distributing 
its· own merchandise that it buys and pays for, 
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there is no need of this application. He would 
be carrying his o'Yn goods over the highway.'' 
The above quoted argun1ent of counsel, appearing 
in plaintiffs' cross-exan1ination of C. L. Ashton, the 
principal owner of the C<?rporate stock of the shipper 
at Roosevelt, Utah, and relating to an objection made 
by applicant to plaintiffs' asking the witness to whom 
he 'vould look for payment if loss occurred to mer-
chandise 'Yhile being hauled en route from Heber City 
to Roosevelt, is followed by an attempt on the part of 
plaintiffs to interpret the testimony of that witness. 
In Inaking such attempt, .they state, again on page 11 
of their brief : 
'' A:nd immediately thereafter that witness 
(C. L. Ashton) testified that in the event of 
loss in transit he would expect Ashton's, Inc., 
to pay for the material because it wouldn't be 
his (C. L .. Ashton's) material yet.'' 
An examination of the whole of the R.~cord, as 
made during the cross-examination of C. L. Ashton, 
permits of no such interpretation. Rather than give 
our own vie,Ys as to what the witness said ·or' meant, 
we quote at some length from the Record, b~ginning on 
p~e 629, and immediately following the above quoted 
argument of plaintiffs' counsel: 
''MR. THURMAN (Counsel for applicant): 
''And it is very obvious, and positively testi-
fied to in this case that Ashton's, Inc. is a mer-
cantile institution, and it also seeks an ap.plica-
tion to haul as a contract carrier. It may do both 
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if this application is granted. It may sell its own 
merchandise, retail or wholesale or in any way it 
sees fit. And it may also, if this application is 
granted, of course, haul for other shippers.'' 
''COM. HACKING·: 
''The objection will be overruled. Do you re-
call the question, Mr. Ashton~" 
"THE WITNESS: 
"About who would pay for the freight 1" 
''MR. RICHARDS: 
''No:" 
''COM. HACKING: 
' 'In the event of the fire. '' 
"THE WITNESS: 
"Yes." 
"A. I would expect Ashton's, Inc. to pay for 
it, - they are hauling it.'' 
"BY MR. RICHARDS (Counsel for plain-
tiffs) : 
"Q. That is, it would be- Well, let's put it 
this way: Thiat is, you would not expect to pay 
for it 1" 
"A. No." 
'' Q. Y.ou didn't get it, did you 1 '' 
''A. That's right." 
·'' Q. And inasmuch as you are paying Ash-
ton's, Inc. for the material, you would expect 
them to deliver it at your place, and if they didn't 
deliver it, why, it wouldn't be your material t" 
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11 
"A. That's right.'' 
''MR. RICHARDS: 
"That's all." 
Plaintiffs' interp·retation of the effect to be given 
to the cross-exainination of the witness, C. L. Ashton, 
on the point in question, is grounded on the last ques-
tion of plaintiffs' counsel and the witness' answer 
thereto, quoted above. The 'answer simply meant that 
if Ashton's, Inc., the applicant, lost the merchandise 
en route and failed to make delivery of it in Roosevelt, 
the 'vitness would not expect to pay for the merchan-
dise. He might well have added that neither would he 
have expected to pay applicant any · of the -hauling 
charge between Heber and Roosevelt. No layman could 
be expected to reach any other conclusion. 
The subject matter of the remarks of counsel and 
the testimony, above quoted, had to do with the method 
of handling pooled railroad car shipments at Heber 
City by the Ashton brothers, for their resp·ective cor-
porations. The several corporations, one (applicant) 
at Heber City, another at Roosevelt and t'vo at Vernal, 
would join together and buy in carload lots, })iaying 
their pro rata share of the freight expenses when the 
material was not billed f.o.b. Heber. Reference was 
made in the testimony to a shipment received from 
Morrison- Merrill, originating, the witness supposed, 
somewhere out of the state. Each of the several shippers, 
including applicant, was invoiced direct by Morrison-
~ferrill for its share of the merchandise. The following 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
questions put by plaintiffs' counsel, and the answers 
made thereto by the witness on cross-examination, be-
ginning on page 624 of the Record, make. very certain 
that applicant, in hauling to Roosevelt a portion of the 
merchandise received by it in a pooled railroad car at 
Heber City, ·was acting :as a carrier of freight for hire 
and not as one moving its own merchandise: 
''Q. How did you pay for your portion, on 
invoice to you or to Lowe 1 
''A.. On invoice to me. 
"Q. Lowe is Ashton's, Inc. 
''A. Th·at's right. 
' 'Q. And the invoice to you was direct to 
you from Morrison-Merrill? 
''A. That's right. 
'' Q. Did you see a bill of lading 
"A. No. 
'' Q. And yet the invoice was to you! 
''A. That's right. 
'' Q. Did you p·ay the freight! 
' 'A. I did not. 
MR. THURMAN (Counsel for applicant): 
You n1ean to Heber? 
''A. I paid the freight from Heber to Roose-
velt. 
. . "Q. But you did not pay any freight on the 
· pooled car? · 
''A. I haven't up to date I know of. 
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13 
''Q .. Well, is the price - is Morrison-Mer-
rill's price f.o.b. Heber 1 
''A. That is my understanding on that par-
ticular shipment. I would have to assume that 
until such time as I had freight bills showing it 
"Tas f.o.b. son1e other point.'' 
Applicant not only operates a large mercantile 
business in Heber City, but also hauls merchandise for 
hire for the Ashton interests located at Roosevelt :and 
, ... ernal, l,..tah, the n1erchandise handled originating at 
- - . 
Salt Lake City and Provo as "\vell as Heber City. The na-
ture of applicant's operations is shown throughout the 
testimony of Lo\Ye Ashton, the principal owner of the cor-
porate stock of applicant. As to the merchandise re-
ceived by applicant from the railroad at Heber City, 
Mr. Ashton testified at considerable length. On page 
202 of the Record, "\Ve find this question and answer: 
"Q. In any ~vent, you distribute that mer-
chandise yourself, that portion of it that belongs 
to your company in Heber, and that portion that 
belongs to Leslie Ashton and Sons Comp.any at 
Roosevelt, - you carry - that is, your corpora-
tion carries to Roosevelt, and likewise you give 
the same service to Vernal for the A~shton Broth-
ers, Inc. ? '' 
"A. We do." 
The number of carloads of freight handled by 
applicant at Heber City in the year 1948, the last full 
year prior to the hearing, was 137 (R .. 200). 
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14 
On page 217 of the Record, we ftnd the following 
testimony of the witness, Lowe Ashton: 
''Q. Now, do you, in order to accommodate 
the demands of the two merchants - or, that is, 
the one corporation in Roosevelt and the two 
corporations in Vernal, - does your company 
carry some fill-in orders~ 
''A. Stock in Heber? 
''Q. Yes. 
''A. Oh, yes, we carry a large jobbing stock 
in Heber. 
"Q. And does that enable you to make 
prompt and quick shipments to Roosevelt and 
Vernal when the demand is made' 
"A. It saves us as much as a day. 
'' Q. And does a day mean something occa-
sionally? 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. Do you maintain a supply of building 
material here (Heber City) on hand? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. For that very purpose' 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. And is there a common carrier . that 
could expeditiously handle that building material 
and put it over in Roosevelt iand Vernal as you 
are able to handle it? 
''A. Well, I am sure there isn-'t, because the 
common carrier's schedule goes through here in 
the night after we would be closed. '' 
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15 
Again quoting fro1n the testimony of Lowe Ashton, 
beginning on page 335 of the Record, as follows: 
''BY MR. THURMAN: 
'~Q. Now, you have referred to maintaining 
certain quantities of merchandise stocks on hand 
at Heber. That, I think you S'aid, was purchased 
by you and kept there. Is that correct 1 
"A. It is on hand by Ashton's, Incorporated. 
'' Q. Yes. Now, do you ever have calls for 
the sale of that merchandise from your brothers' 
store at Roosevelt and your brothers' store at 
\'ernal !'' 
(This question was objected to on the ground that 
I 
it was repetitious, Commissioner Hacking remarking, 
"I think he testified from the outset that he did ware-
house goods at Heber, and that he loaded goods from 
that warehouse.'') 
Continuing, from page 336 of the Record: 
''Q. Now, if merchandise is ordered from. 
you by noon or early afternoon, on a given day, 
from Roosevelt, when do you get that into Roose-
velt' 
"A. Well, if he needs it he will have it that 
night. If he needs it today, he will have it that 
night. 
"Q. And is that true with Vernal, also? 
"A. Yes sir." 
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There is ample testimony, we submit, to establish 
the existence of a definite need for a certificated con-
tract carrier service from Heber City to Roosevelt and 
Vernal, for the transportation of merchandise arriving 
by rail at Heber City and invoiced for immediate dis-
tribution to the three _ship·pers in the Uintah Basin, or 
to be held in stock by applicant for sale and distribution 
to them as and when call is made. 
(b) 
The second category under Point I of plaintiffs' 
brief, indentified ·as (b), is directd to the finding of the 
Commission that Ashton Brothers, Inc. (at Vernal), and 
Leslie Ashton and Sons Company (at Roosevelt), require 
the particular service made available by applicant in 
order to transport fresh meats, fruits and vegetables. 
The finding, dealing with this matter, is the second of 
the two special findings heretofore quoted. As a matter 
of convenience, \Ve again quote that finding: 
"That said two Ashton mercantile shippers, 
located at Roosevelt and Vernal, sell large quan-
tities of fresh meats, fruits and vegetables, "rhich 
are highly perishable; that applicant, in the trans-
portation of said commodities from Salt Lake to 
Roosevelt and Vernal, has made, and is now mak-
ing, three trips weekly, leaving Salt Lake City 
in mid afternoon, and arriving in Heber City in 
the early evening, and in Roosevelt and Vernal 
at approximately 8 and 9 o'clock P.M., respec-
tively, on the same day; that upon arriving at 
destination, applicant unloads said merchandise 
and places the same after business hours, in 
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refrigerators and coolers located in- the stores 
of said two Ashton mercantile shippers, !and that 
by such means said Inerchandise is adequately 
preserved and can be made ready for display and 
sale at the time of the opening of the stores on 
the .following n1orning. This practice has con-
tinued for ·a long period; and the business methods 
?f. the parties have been built upon ~his system.'' 
A brief reference to· the ~estimony will disclose that 
there ·was ample evidence to support that finding. 
The element of time,_ in transporting merchandise 
~rom point of origin to point of destination in the Uintah 
Basin, it was testified, is an in1portant factor in enabling 
the two mercantile institutions at Roosevelt and Vernal 
to serve the . public. We quote · the following redirect 
testimony of Lowe Ashton, the principal corporate stock 
owner ·of applicant, beginning on page 322 of the R~cord: 
BY MR. THURMAN: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Ashton, do you haul any meat, 
do you propose to haul any meat, and have you 
been hauling meat for the Vern!al store and the 
Roosevelt store from Salt Lake City¥ 
"A. We do. 
'' Q. Fresh meats¥ 
' 'A. Fresh and cured, both. 
''Q. Now, where do you pick that meat up 
at in Salt Lake City' 
''A. From Cudahy's delivery truck. 
"Q. Where would that truck be~ 
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''A. Well, he has, I believe, a set delivery 
that meets our truck about one o'clock. 
"Q. One o'clock 'about three times a week7 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And the meat which you carry to Roose-
velt, how do you handle that~ 
''A. Well, we load all of the meat on approxi-
mately the last item we do load, and we carry 
it through on the regular freight truck, and un-
load it in Roosevelt or Vernal. 
"Q. - Now, when do you reach Vernal with 
that truck1 
''A. Oh, between nine and ten p.m., average. 
'' Q. That is Vernal~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. Between nine and ten of the. day you 
pick up, up around some time after noon~ 
"A. About one. 
'' Q. And then is the Vernal store open at 
that time~ 
''A. Well, they have a night m~an at each of 
the stores. 
'' Q. Vernal and Roosevelt~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And what is done with that meat upon 
its arrival in Vernal~ 
''A. It requires refrigeration immediately, 
in the refrigerator. 
'' Q. Of course, meat is a perish-able article, 
isn't it~ 
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"A. It is. 
'' Q. And if it were left in a truck over night, 
what would be the result~ 
'' .J..~. Well, in the summer it wo-q.ld have a 
good chance to spoil. 
"Q. So you put it right in the refrigerator 
the night it gets to Vernal; is that correct 1 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. .And just as soon as it gets there? 
''A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Now, what time does your truck reach 
Roosevelt? 
''A. About eight to nine. 
'' Q. In the evening~ 
"A. y . es sir. 
'' Q. Between eight and nine in the evening; 
and does the store at Roosevelt handle a con-
siderable quantity of meat~ 
"A. Yes; they handle more fresh meat than 
Vernal by truck. 
'' Q. And how do you take ~are of that upon 
arrival in Roosevelt between eight and nine at 
night? 
"A. Put it in the refrigerator. 
'' Q. Right at the store? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Is there a night man there to assist in 
that work1 · 
"A. Yes sir. 
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'' Q. And you have already stated that the 
common carrier truck arriving in Vernal and 
Roosevelt is on the day following pick-up in 
Salt Lake City¥ · 
"A. Yes sir. 
''Q. Now, what portion of the merchandise 
that you contemplate hauling for the three cor-
porations, two in Vernal, one in Roosevelt-what 
portion of that, based on your experience, will 
.be made up of the heavier materials such as 
cement and lumber? 
"A. About fifty per cent. 
''Q. About fifty i>:er cent would be lumber 
~and cement; is that correct? 
"A. Of our total freight we haul. 
'',Q. Yes? 
"A. Between fifty and sixty per cent. 
''Q. I see. And what would the p·ercentage 
be on the balance, say forty or fifty per cent of 
the balance, would be made up of groceries and 
-other merchandise, wouldn't it? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. And what per cent of that forty or 
fifty per cent .would be made up of groceries? 
''A. Well, maybe I could answer better by 
giving·you one specific truck that we run on Mon-
day, Wednesday and ·Friday. 
'' Q. All right, go ahead. 
''A. That truck hauls the intrastate freight. 
That would include hardware and dry goods and 
some building materials, groceries, :and fruit and 
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vegetables, and I usually figure that that load is 
going to run from seventy-from .sixty-five to 
seventy-five per cent groceries and p·erishable 
fruit and vegetables. Is that what-? 
"Q. Yes. Sixty-five to seventy-five per cent 
groceries and perishable fruits and vegetables; 
1s that correct 1 
''A. Yes, that is.'' 
Again, from the. direct testimony of C. L. Ashton, 
beginning on page 583 of the Record: . 
'' Q. Now, """here do you :purchase your meats? 
''A. Some of our meats locally, in and about 
Roosevelt; but beef and cured meats are all pur-
chased, practically exclusively, from Cudahy's, 
with some small fraction coming from American 
Packing Company. 
"Q. And how is it hauled to you at Roosevelt 
from Cudahy .and the American Packing Com-
pany' 
''A. By Ash tons, Inc. 
'' Q. When is that merchan<lise picked up 
In Salt Lake City or in Ogden' 
''A. Well, today is a typical example-this 
is the day they pick it up. I would say it would 
be picked up here around one or two o'clock to-
day, or in that neighborhood, just before the , 
truck would leave. 
''Q. That would be on Monday~ 
"A. Yes sir, that is today. 
'' Q. And when will that merchandise be de-
livered to you at Roosevelt? 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
''..A.. Approximately eight o'clock tonight. 
"Q. Ap·proximately eight o'clock tonight? 
''A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. What is done with it when- it reaches 
Roosevelt? 
"A. We have a night man, and it is taken 
off the truck and p·ut in the cooler. 
'' Q. Is your store closed at that time to the 
general public~ 
"A. Closed at six o'clock. 
''Q. But upon its arrival around eight o'clock 
it is taken· off by the night man~ 
''A. All of our meat is taken off by the 
night man. 
''Q. And what is done with that by the 
night man' 
''A. Placed in refrigeration;. 
'' Q. In your place o~ business Y 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. If it were allowed to remain on the 
truck over night, would that be detrimental to 
your meat business~ 
''A. If it was warm weather or extremely 
cold, either one, would be hazardous for the 
spoilage of meat. 
''Q. What would the effect of extremely cold 
weather have on it~ 
''A. Meat shouldn't be frozen and then 
thawed. 
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''Q. This n1eat you purchas:e, when you get 
it from Cudahy, has it been frozen~ 
'• A. No sir, it is just well chilled. 
'' Q. So it should not be frozen thereafter~ 
" .. A.. Meat can't be frozen and then thawed 
out and placed back in refrigeration and have 
. good meat. 
''Q. And of course, what effect would ex-
tremely warm weather, or summer weather, have 
on meat carried on a truck through the night~ 
"A. You would get a sweaty, slimy condi-
tion in the meat, which would cause it soon to 
decay and rot,-spoil. 
. '' Q. Could you remain in business and com-:-
pete with your competitor if you didn't have 
this type of service for your meat~" 
"MR. RICHARDS: I will object on the 
ground there is no showing that he has tried 
any other type of service. · 
''MR. THURMAN: W·ell, he has shown quite 
a bit of qualification. 
"A. Well, I can .answer that. I have, and 
I have had it delivered at five o'clock in the 
afternoon.-
"COM. HACKING: Just a minute, Mr. Ash-
ton. · · 
''MR. THURMAN: We will submit the ques-
tion. 
''COM. HACKING: The objection will be 
overruled. 
''MR. THURMAN: Overruled 1 
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''COM. HACKING: Overruled. 
''MR. THURMAN: Now, just state-
''COM. HACKING: Answer the question. 
'' MR: THURMAN: Read the question, Mr. 
Johnson, if you will, please. 
(Thereupon the last question was read by 
the reporter, as follows:) 
'' Q. Could you remain· in business and com-
p·ete with your competitor if you didn't have 
this type of service for your meat? 
''A. Well, I guess if a person-if we ·went 
back to handling just home-grown and slaugh-
tered meat, that it would be possible to stay in 
business, but we couldn't serve the public with 
Grade A beef that we could get out of Cudahy's 
unless it could be bought there .and kept 1n a 
Grade A condition. 
BY MR. THURMAN: 
"Q. Now, after you receive meat at your 
place of business at Roosevelt~ does it take some 
time to put the merchandise into your store and 
have it all ready for the public, your customers Y 
''A. Yes. Naturally you would have to un-
p.ack it and check it and mark it. 
"Q. And is your night man able to put 
that in stock and have it ready for the public 
by the following morning? 
''A. . He doesn't do that, no sir. 
'' Q. He doesn't do that 7 
"A. N . o. sir. 
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ing do that, is that correct' 
"A. Yes sir. 
''Q. Now~ do you have other perishable shi~ 
Il)~nts ~esides n1eat that you sell at your place 
-of business in Roosevelt~ 
-· "A~- .Well,-we don't have-we get our vege-
tables a little differently than Vernal; so that 
part doesn't affect us the same as it. qoes Vernal. 
''Q. I see. 
"A. ..\Ve have other perishable items, but-
''Q. What other -perishable items do you 
have' 
''A. We handle frozen foods in our locker 
business, and we also have the ice cream products 
that come in. -
'' Q. Do you handle vegetables~ 
''·A. Yes. 
'' Q. And where do you get your vegetables 
from' 
''A. We get most of ours from Perry Har-
per that come into Salt Lake, and Norton's that 
. come into Provo .. They come out there and sell 
it to us. 
'' Q. From peddlers, so to speak~ 
''A. Right. 
"Q. So, Ashton's, Inc. doesn't haul vege-
tables from Salt Lake to Roosevelt for you? 
''A. They haul some, but not like--
'' Q. Not like they do in Vernal t 
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''A. No, not like they do in Vernal.'' 
And again, from the redirect testimony of the wit-
ness, C. L. Ashton, beginning on page 631 of the Record: 
''Q. Now, you said in answer to Mr. Rich-
ards that you bought the majority of your green 
stuff from peddlers coming through there two or 
three times a week? 
''A. That'·s right. 
''Q. Now, green stuff, of course you mean by 
that vegetables and perishables~ 
"A. Yes. Well, in food, except vegetables 
and fruit, I would s~y in the main. 
"Q. From whom or how do you get the bal-
ance of your green stuff? 
''A. We order the same as he does in V er-
nal. Things that we can't get from these p·eddlers, 
we send in an order to the Pacific people and 
get it. 
''Q. At Salt Lake City~ 
''A. And the same procedure. 
"Q. And I take it Ashton's, Inc. brings that 
on to you~ 
''A. That's right. 
''Q. And is that green stuff brought in by 
Ashton's, Inc. handled in the same manner as 
your meats-? 
''A. We have a refrigerator for both vege-
tables and meats, separate. 
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'~Q. So that the·· green stuff reaches you the 
night before you put it on the n1arket in Roose-
velt, is that correct J? 
''A. Yes, that's right.'' 
.r\..11 of the \Yitne~se~ called by applicant gave testi-
Inony showing the .need of a type of service offered by 
applicant to meet the requirements of the three shippers, 
one located at Roosevelt, and two at Vernal, and some 
of those \Yitnesses gave testimony sufficient to definitely 
establish that the co1nmon carrier service made avail-
able to the public by plaintiffs was inadequate to meet 
said ship.pers' requirements. 
Contrast the type of service which the record shows 
applicant offered to perform and -vvhich the record 
sho-vvs the three shippers required, with the common 
carrier service rendered by plaintiffs into Roosevelt and · 
Vernal. We quote from the redirect testimony of the 
witness, C. L. Ashton, beginning on page '639 of the 
Record: 
"Q. Now, are you familiar with Uintah 
Freight Line trucks, that is, the a~p.pearance of 
them as you see them on the road~ 
''A. I am. 
"Q. Are they identified with any lettering~ 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. And what is that lettering' 
''A. Well, in most instances it is '' Uintah 
Freight Lines'', -and a lot of the operations that 
come out there are marked ''Inland." 
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"Q. "Inland" or "Uintah Freight Lines"! 
''A. That's right. 
I 
''Q. Now, have you seen them op·erate leav-
ing Roosevelt going easterly toward VernalY 
"A. I have. 
''Q. In the early morning hours? 
''A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. The morning hours~ 
"A. Y·es sir. 
''Q. And what time have you seen them 
operate leaving Roosevelt 1 
MR. RICHARDS: Objection; no time and 
place being stated,-indefinite and uncertain. 
BY MR. THURMAN: 
"Q. During the last few months. 
MR. RICHARDS: Immaterial. 
BY MR. THURMAN: 
"Q. During the last few months. 
COM. HACKING: What do you want to 
show by this ~ 
MR. THURMAN: I want to show they lea:ve 
Roosevelt late. 
MR. RICHARD·S: He doesn't even know 
whether there is any cargo in them. 
MR. THURMAN: That is all right. 
MR. RICHARDS: I object to it as incompe-
tent, irrelevant and immaterial,-and no showing 
as to the time and place. 
MR. _THURMAN : I am trying to get the time 
~_nd place. 
COM. HACKING: Well, the witness may 
answer. 
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MR. THURMAN: Go ahead. 
''A. I see the trucks pass our place of busi-
ness after I go down to work in the morning. 
. . ' 
' 'Q. Have you kept any exact time as to 
when you sa:\v them? 
''A. I haYe not. 
'' Q. Do you see then1 always at the same 
time leaving Roosevelt? 
''A. I don't. Sometimes I don't see them· at 
all. 
"Q. Well, what hours have you seen them, 
we will say during this year' · 
''A. Well, I ordinarily - I go down to work 
approximately somewhere in the neighborhood of 
seven.o'clock in the morning, and I have seen the 
trucks go by going east after I have arrived at 
the store. 
"Q. Do you know how ·late you have seen 
them pass your place on the way going east? 
''A. No. I know that they rp:ass after-· I have 
seen them pass after I get to work. 
"Q. And you say it is thirty miles between 
Roosevelt and Vernal' 
"A. That's right." 
Now here in the testimony of p·laintiffs' witnesses 
do we find any claim that plaintiffs' trucks could or did 
reach Roosevelt and Vernal before the morning of the 
day following the loading of the merchandise in Salt 
Lake City. This, applicant's shipper witnesses testified, 
did not enable them to meet the needs of the buying 
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public at Roosevelt and Vernal. And the shipper wit-
nesses, in their testimony hereinbefore quoted, gave the 
particulars in which, and the reasons why, the service 
offered by plaintiffs was not adequate to meet the needs 
in question. 
(c) 
The third and last category under Point I of plain-
tiffs' brief, identified as (c), is directed to the finding 
of the Commission relating to emergency calls for 
cement in truckload quantities from Devil 's Slide,, Utah. 
The finding in question is the third of the three specific 
findings, to which reference has heretofore been made 
in this brief, and, for convenience, it is again quoted: 
''That said three shi~.pers have emergency rush 
calls, arising p~articularly from the oil drilling, 
and the building construction incident thereto, in 
the Roosevelt .and Vernal areas, for cement in 
truck load quantities; that said comn1odity is 
~ighly competitive and is. available, at Devil 's 
Slide, Utah, at a slightly lower price than in the 
Salt Lake City market; that protestant, Uintah 
Freight Lines, does not operate between Devil's 
Slide. and the Uintah Basin, and that none of the 
other protestants has offered to perform said 
transportation service between Devil 's Slide and 
the Uintah Basin or do they have equipment sta-
tioned at any point along the route, or has stated 
that it was :able to perform the kind of service 
required by said three 'Shippers.'' 
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We have heretofore stated that the hauling of 
cement from Devil 's Slide to Roosevelt and Vernal, 
Utah, was wholly immaterial to any issue involved in 
the matters now under consideration. The only testi-
mony in the record relating to carrier service available 
between Devil 's Slide and points within the Uintah 
Basin has to do "~ith the service ~performed by Ash-
worth Transfer Company, a partnership, and Salt L~k~ 
Transfer Company, a partnership, both of which had 
common carrier rights over practically all ,the highways 
of the State of Utah, including the highways between 
Devil's Slide and the Uintah Basin. Plaintiffs made 
reference to these rights on page 4 of their brief, stat-
ing that after the hearing had been under way for some 
time, "These carriers joined in the protest insofar a.s 
it involved transportation of cement from Devil's Slide, 
Utah, to Heber City, Roosevelt, and Vernal, Utah, and 
it was stipulated that these two carriers are common 
carriers with operating authority and adequate equip-
ment at all times to transport required commodities, in-
cluding cement, between Devil's Slide and Heber City_, 
Roosevelt, and Vernal, Utah." While the record shows 
that such a stipulation was in fact entered into (R. 879-
880), it is nevertheless apparent that the p·ermit issued 
by the Public Service Commis-sion, here under consid-
eration, insofar as the granting of the right to operate 
between Devil's Slide and the two points in the Uintah 
Basin is concerned, is not now a subject for review by 
this Court. The two partn-ership carriers (Ashworth 
Transfer Company and Salt Lake Transfer Company) 
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alone had the right to complain, but neither filed a peti-
tion nor joined with plaintiffs in their petition for a 
writ of review. Following the granting of the permit by 
the Commission, none ·of the required statutory steps 
was taken to ·invoke -the jurisdiction of. this Court to 
review the legality of that portion ·of the Commission's 
order granting applicant a permit between Devil 's Slide 
and the Uintah Basin. 
At the outset· of their discussion under this head-
mg (plaintiffs' brief, p.age 17), category (c), plaintiffs 
state that "The transportation of cement from Devil's 
Slide to Heber City, Roosevelt and Vernal, is the most 
important item involved iri the hearing." In support of 
this statement, they refer to the testimony of Lowe Ash-
ton, principal ow·ner of the corporate ·stock of ap:pli-
cant (R. 299), wherein the witness testified that the 
hauling of cem~nt during the year 1948 constituted about 
one-: half of the tonnage handled by . applicant. '' * • * 
But, despite this,'' plaintiffs further state on page 18 
of their brief, ''no request was ever made upon Uintah 
Freight Lines· to transport cement.'' (R. 425.) 
Presumably, plaintiffs felt that they should have 
had the business. The shippers, however, it is reason-
able to assume, desired to make their purchases of ce-
ment at D·evil 's Slide, and neither of the rplainti:ffs had 
operating rights to or from that 1point, the Uintah 
Freight Lines having rights between Salt Lake City 
and the Uintah Ba.sin only (R. 67, 68, 69 and 70), and 
Eastern Utah Transportation Company between Price 
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and the Uintah Basin only (R. 67 and 70). The ship-
pers, we submit, were not limited, in purchasing their 
cement, to points in the territory covered by plaintiffs' 
certificate of convenience and necessity, one of which 
points was Salt Lake City. And this is so despite the 
inference implicit in the complaint of the p·lainti:ff, Uin-
tah Freight Lines, appearing at the top of page 19 of 
their brief. The haul which that plaintiff had in mind 
was from Salt Lake City-not Devil 's Slide-to the des-
tination points in question. This is made clear by the 
cross-examination of Ray Lilenquist, the principal owner 
of the corporate stock of the two plaintiff companies, in 
explaining why the Uintah Freight Lines got no cement 
haul at all in 1948. We quote from the Record, begin-
ning on page 814: 
"BY MR. THURMAN: 
"Q. Did I understand you to say, Mr. Lilen-
quist, that in 1948 Ashtons carried cement, a 
large quantity of cement, and that was one of 
the reasons why you lost-or dropped in your 
tonnage in 1948 over 1947~ 
"A. You understood me to say that '47 we 
hauled quite a sizeable quantity of cement, and 
we didn't haul any in 1948, _the reason being that 
the account was lost to Ashton brothers and that 
they hauled the cement. 
"Q. In other words, it was taken by Ashton 
Brothers, Inc. at Vernal, where theretofore some 
one of your shippers had furnished. it~ 
"A. No, I understood that Ashton Brothers, 
Inc. was at Heber City. It w.as taken by Rae 
Ashton at Vernal. · -
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· . '' Q. Ashton Brothers, Inc. is at Vernal.· 
"A. Well, if that is correct, why that's 
right. 
'' Q. Now, who was the owner and seller of 
that cement that you handled in 1947~ 
''A. Well, the biggest supplier" of it was the 
Ketchum Builders. 
· "Q. Ketchum Builders in Salt Lake ··city~ 
"A. Yes sir.'' 
·It is quite· impossible to understand any basis for 
plaintiffs' position that upon their protest, the Commis-
sion ·had no right to grant a contract carrier permit to 
an applicant seeking -to op·era te between Devil' s Slide 
and the Uintah··Basin, a route not covered by plaintiffs' 
operating rights, or that shippers locateq. within the 
Uintah Basin were li1nited, in buying their cement, to 
Salt L~ke City, Utah, silnply because. Uintah Freight 
Lines V\7as authorized to serve the Uintah Basin from 
that point, but ·not from Devil's Slide. 
We might also add that the evidence shows that 
Ashworth Transfer Company and Salt Lake Transfer 
Company have their principal and sole places of busi-
ness in Salt Lake City, Utah; therefore, by reason of 
that fact, those carriers could not give the expeditious 
se!"vice requited at times by the Ashton Mercantile 
establishments located .at Roosevelt and Vernal, Utah, 
for the handling of emergency shipments from Devil's 
Slide to Uintah Basin. The distance from Salt Lake 
City to Devil 's Slide 1-s approximately one hundred 
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miles, and both fac.tors of time and expense involved in 
this .additional mileage might make unavailable or pro-
hibitive any dependable service from Devil 's Slide. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDING THAT ASHTON'S, INC., DID NOT WIL-
FULLY TRANSPORT COMMODITIES WITHOUT AUTHOR-
ITY, CAN NOT BE SUPPORTED. 
At the outset of their discussion under this heading 
(page 19, their brief), rplaintiffs state that "The report 
of the Commission rather gives the impression that the 
transp-ortation service of Ashton's at Heber City was 
.lawful until Ashton's, Inc., was formed in 1946, '' and 
then add, ''There is no basis for this impression, as it 
is plain that for twenty years or so the businesses in 
the three towns have been separate and the fact that 
they were owned as stockholders or partners by t~e 
same three p~ersons, would not identify their interests 
and obviate the obtaining of certificates from the Public 
Service Commission.'' 
We agree with plaintiffs that whenever members of 
the Ashton family operated their business interests as 
corporations, after the enactment of Chapter 53, Laws 
of Utah,. 1933, the transportation of their merchandise 
into the Uintah Basin by some member of the family, to 
whom the corporations tp.aid the hauling charge, was a 
technical violation of the Utah Public Utility law. But 
we deny that in so transporting said merchandise there 
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was any wilful intent on the part of the hauler, applicant 
in. ·~he insta.nt prQceeding, to viola.te. the law. 
. . . 
Prior to the Le.gisla.tive Act of 1933, a motor ve-
hicle acting as a carrier of freight, was identified in our 
law as a "motor transportation corporation'', and was 
.defined· as a carrier engaged in or transacting the busi-
-ness. of transporting freight; merchandise or other 
property, for more than. one person, under ·contract or 
otherwise (Section 76-5-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933), and. in that year the Legislature eliminated the 
''for more than one person'' p.rovision and defined a 
contract motor ·-carrier as any person engaged in the 
transportatio.n by motor- vehicle of property for hire 
and not included in the · definition of a cominon motor 
.carrier of. property. 
. . 
In nearly every session of the Utah Legislature 
since the enactment of the Public Utility law in 1917, 
the laws relating to the control of motor vehicles for 
hire,· and the definitions as to what constitutes a motor 
vehicle for hire, have undergone changes. Little wonder 
that on the part of the general public, there has been 
more or fess uncertainty as to just what· this changing 
law was at any particular time. 
Since the establishment of the mercantile institu-
tions by Leslie Ashton in the Uintah Basin, beginning 
as far back as 1898, one or more members of his family 
(now consisting of his widow, M~s. Leslie Ashton, and 
their three sons) have acted as the hauling agent for 
the Ashton interests. Mercantile institutions were estab-
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lished at both Roosevelt and Vernal, and later at Heber 
City, a point outside the Uintah Basin. The kind and 
type of entity owning the separate institutions changed 
from time to time, back and forth, but the members of 
the Ashton family always retained prop.riet.ary control. 
The right to so operate, in serving the Ashtons, 
without a permit so to do from the Commission, was 
never challenged, nor was complaint made, to or by the 
Commission, until shortly prior to the filing of appli-
cant's instant application for a permit to operate as a 
contract motor carrier of property for the Ashton- cor-
porations at Roosevelt and Vernal,. Utah. Complying 
with the request of a representative of the Commission, 
applicant filed such an application on January 30, 1948. 
(R. 1 and 2.) 
Through~ut their testimony the three sons of Leslie 
Ashton stated that they at all times regarded and looked 
upon the three mercantile institutions as a family affair. 
No other persons at .any time had any interest whatso-
ever in any of the institutions op~erated by them in Roose-
velt, Vernal and Heber City. They apparently knew, 
following the enactment of the 1933 Public Utility law, 
' ' 
relating to- the operation of motor vehicles for hire, if. 
the member of the family who was hauling the ~erchan­
dise at any particular tirrie desired to haul merchandise 
for some outside interest, not a member of the family, 
that the law required the securing of a contract carrier 
permit from the Public Service Commission .. And they 
comrp.lied ~th that law when, in 1938, aft€:r. ·entering into 
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a contract with the Shell Oil Company for the trans-
portation of that company's products from Salt Lake 
City to Heber City and Roosevelt, applicant filed an 
application for a contract carriers' permit, and, after 
a hearing before the Commission, permit No. 206 was 
granted to haul the products of the Shell Oil Company. 
(R. 175-176.) 
But the point now under consideration in this brief 
1s whether applicant, under all the circumstances dis-
closed by the record, was guilty of wilful intent to violate 
the Utah law. The Commission, in its report, after an 
extended hearing of the case, both in Heber City and 
Salt Lake City, made detailed findings of the manner 
in which .. the. family operated and changed its opera-
tions in the towns of Roosevelt and Vernal. The find-
ings as to such opera-tions are contained within the two 
paragraphs heretofor,e quoted in this brief, and are fol-
lowed by the paragraph in which the Commission 
found-
''That there is no evidence of wilful intent to 
violate the law during the many years that Leslie 
Ashton, deceased, or one or more of his said three 
sons, as individuals, or as partners, or as cor-
porations, have transported merchandise from 
S.alt Lake City to Heber City, Roosevelt and Ver-
nal, Utah, serving Ashton mercantile stores and 
gasoline service station located in said cities, and 
the Commission has treated the operations as pri-
vate hauls." (R. 105.) 
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The finding of the Comn1ission as to the manner in 
\Vhich it, the Commission itself, looked u1pon and re-
garded the transp.ortation operations in question, with 
which operations it had been familiar over a long period 
of time, is of itself sufficient to show that there was no 
wilful intent to violate the law. What more could the 
Commis·sion do to make clear its own attitude on the 
issue of wilful intent, than to find that the ''Commission 
has treated the operations as private hauls''? Because 
of the practice that had been developed ~d followed by 
the members of the Ashton family in establishing and 
developing mercantile institution'S in the Uintah B·asin, 
and in supplying those institutions with all necessary 
transportation facilities, the Ashton family, quite the 
same as the Commission, looked upon its tran'Sportation 
op-erations as "private hauls". If the Commission so 
regarded such transportation operations, then how can 
it be s.aid that applicant was guilty of wilful intent, if it 
entertained the same view? 
In concluding their discussion of the question of 
wilful violation, beginning on page 21 of their brief, 
plaintiffs state ''There is not one word of testimony in 
this very lengthy record which says that any one of the 
three Ashton brothers was ignorant of. the requirements 
of the law, and that he believed that their operation com-
plied with the law, and that a certificate was unneces-
sary because of the family relationship. * * * '' 
The record discloses that our opponents err in 
making such statement. 
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. At one point in his testimony, Lowe Ashton, while 
under cross examination by plaintiffs, was interrogated 
relative to applicant's filing annual reports with the 
Public Service Commission. Beginning on page 280 
or the Record, we quote the following: 
'' Q. What year is the report you have In 
your hand' 
''A. '48. 
''Q. · It is '48~ 
''A. ·This only covers the equipment ·that is 
under 206 (referring to Permit No. 206, granting 
authority to haul Shell Oil Comp-any products), 
too. 
"Q. Will you show us in the exhibit-in 
· your Ashton's, Inc. report, annual report for 
1948, that you have in your hand, the profit and 
loss statement or operating statement that ap-
pears therein~ 
''A. This does not cover Ashton's, Inc., and 
we were requested--by telephone by Mr. String-
ham to not put into this re,p.ort anything that 
pertained to the operation other than the hauling 
of Shell petroleum products .. 
'' Q. Who made that request of you! 
''A. Mr. Stringham. 
''Q. What Stringham~ 
''A. Well, I believe he was secretary here, or 
something. 
"Q. And how .long ago T 
''A. About three months ago. 
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'' Q. So that the report that you filed in 
1948 does not contain any account of your opera-
tions for 1948 for transportation to Leslie Ash-
ton an~ Sons Company and Ashton Brothers, 
Inc. 1 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. Have you made any report of that op-
eration 7 
"A. No sir. 
'' Q. I am talking, to the Public Service Com-
mission. You have made none to the Public Ser-
vice Commission 7 
''A. We have made all reports the Public 
Service Commission has asked us to make. 
''Q. Yes. That is based on Mr. Stringham's 
statement to you' 
''A. That's right. 
"Q. · Was that statement in writing¥ 
''A. No. It was over the telephone. 
'' Q. You called him, or did he call you 1 
''A. I believe he called me, but I am not 
sure. 
''Q. Well, you would know, wouldn't you, 
whether you had occasion to call him on the 
subject1 
''A. I have called and talked to the Com-
mission at different times, and to Mr. Slaughter, 
but .I wouldn't remember whether he · called me 
or I called him. 
"Q. When did you call Mr. Slaughter last 
about· this subject of including the operations Y 
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"A. I didn't talk to Mr. Slaughter about this. 
'' Q. Oh, you did not~ 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. Just talked to Mr. Slaughter abo.ut your 
operations~ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. And did Mr. Slaughter tell you whether 
or not it was lawful-
'' A. Mr. Slaughter told us the Commission's 
attitude, he thought, would be for us to go on .and 
continue until such time as the hearing was held. 
We have operated that way for over a year. 
"Q. And you have been operating for the 
last year under that arrangement. Did he tell 
you why a hearing was necessary? 
"A. No. We just received - You mean 
originally~ 
' 'Q. Y e.s, over a year ago. 
''A. Well,_ they were going to have a hear-
ing on this entire· case, but it would normally 
· have been called, I guess, the first part of 1948. 
''Q. Did he tell you why it w .. as necessary to 
have a hearing? 
''A. We presumed it was necessary because 
of the change in the - apparently in the change• 
of operation, is all. 
''Q. Why didn't you file your ap.plication 
when you changed your operation in 1945? 
q A. W c didn't think we needed to. We were 
op~ratin!J .as we always had, in so far as our feel-
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ings toward each other were concerned, and we 
just didn't make a new application. 
"Q. By that, Mr. Ashton, you .mean that you 
had the same financial arrangements 1 
''A. I said ''feelings''. 
"Q. Well, what do you mean by "feelings"? 
''A. Well, brotherly interest, I guess. 
"Q. That is, of helping each other? 
"A. No, it was just going on the same way 
and doing-
'' Q. How was it going on? 
''A. We were buying together, and those 
things have never changed. 
'' Q. Your ~.ractices of buying together were 
the same' 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. And continued tn be the same. What 
other practices continued to be the same' 
''A. The practice of hauling the freight con-
tinued the same, and we continued to distribute 
the same type of gasoline with the same type of 
arrangement with the supplier. There were no 
changes except the financial change in our struc-
ture and our businesses.'' 
The finding by the Commission of the absence of 
evidence of wilful intent to violate the law, we submit, 
is amply supported by the record. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44: 
POINT III. 
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT ONLY 
WILFUL VIOLATIONS PRECLUDE THE GRANTING OF 
CERTIFICATES. 
While the Commission did not expressly find, con-
clude or hold, as contended for by plaintiffs, that ''only 
wilful vi.olat~ons preclude the granting of certificates," 
it is nevertheless reasonable to assume that the Com-
mission was acting on the concept that such rule of 
p.rocedure was the proper one to pursue, when it in-
cluded 'vithin its Report the finding-
"That there is no evidence of wilful intent to 
violate the law during the many years that Leslie 
Ashton, deceased, or one or more of his said three 
sons, as individuals, or as 'partnerships, or as 
corporations, have transported merchandise from 
Salt Lake City to Heber City, Roosevelt and Ver-
nal, Utah, serving the Ashton Mercantile Stores 
rand gasoline service .station, located in said cities, 
and the Commission has treated the operations as 
private hauls.'' 
Nowhere in the Utah statute, relating to the gr~ant­
~ng of a permit to a contract motor carrier, is it ex-
pressly said that one who may have operated in viola-
tion of the law, even wilfully, is not entitled to and 
cannot receive a permit. The law itself is silent re-
specting past operations. The statutory requirements 
for the granting of a contract motor carrier permit are 
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set forth in the second paragraph of Section 76-5-21, 
Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1945. The paragraph reads: 
''CONTRACT CARRIER - INTRASTATE 
COMMERCE- PERMIT. 
"· ... 
''The commission upon the filing of an applica-
tion for a contract motor carrier's permit, shall 
fix a time and place for hearing thereon .and may 
give the same notice as provided in section 76-
5-18 hereof. If, from all the testimony offered at 
said hearing, the commission shall determine that 
the highways over which the applicant desires to 
operate are not unduly burdened; that the grant-
ing of the application will not unduly interfere 
with the traveling public; and that the granting 
of the application will not be detrimental to_ the 
best interests of the people of the State of Utah 
and/or to the localities to be servedt and if the 
existing transportation facilities do not provide 
adequate or reasonable service, the Commission 
shall grant such permit. '' 
Each and all of those statutory requirements, th.e 
Commission found, had been met by applicant . 
. For use by prospective applicants the Commission 
maintains a supply of printed forms of application. 
P·aragraph 9 of the form reads: 
"9. That applicant will com~ly with all provi-
sions and requirements of the laws of the State 
of Utah relative to the . operation of motor ve-
hicles for hire, .and will comply with :al~ the rules 
and regulations promulgated by the Public Ser-
vice Commission of Utah ... ' ' 
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Such · a form w.aAs used and sworn to by applicant 
( . 
in the instant proceeding when it filed its api>lication 
with the Commission on January 30, 1948. (R. 2.) And 
upon the hearing of the application, and before ruling 
thereon, it was proper for the commission to inquire 
into and determine, and it was its inherent right so to 
do, whether applicant would, if granted a permit, com-
ply with the law, and the Commission's rules and regu-
lations. H~aving, from the testimony introduced at the 
hearing, resolved the question of ''intent'', the Commis-
sion found there was no -evidence of wilful intent, and, 
obviously based upon its own experience with the Ash-
ton operations, significantly added to that finding, that 
the ''commission has treated the operations as private 
hauls." 
Certainly, where a clear case of wilful intent to 
violate the law is sh,own, the Commission, in the exercise 
of its discretion, would be justified in denying an appli-
cation. But the same logic that suggests such a ruling 
also suggests that where there is shown no wilful intent 
to violate the law, and where all of the specified require-
ments of the statute have been met, the application 
should be granted. 
From a review of the cases and of the. Commission 
Reports, cited ·and quoted from by plaintiffs (pages 22 
to 29, their brief), the most that can be said is that cer-
tain regulatory commissions, including the Utah Com-
mission, have at ·times, in passing on applications for 
certificates of convenience and necessity and for contract 
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carrier permits, denied the application when it was 
shown that applicant had operated contrary to law. All 
of the cases ·and reports cited, however, deal ·either (1) 
with an application where a wilful violation of the law 
is affirmatively and expressly found, or (2) with one 
showing prior violations with no express finding as to 
whether the operation was or was not carried on with 
wilful intent to violate the law, but always where there 
was, from the evidence, an inescapable inference of a 
wilful violation. 
Only two of the Utah cases and reports cited (D. & 
R. G. W. R. R. v. Linck, 56 F. 2d 957, and Rowley v. 
:· P. S. C., 112 Utah 116, 185 P. 2d 514), reached the 
courts. None -of the other Utah cas.es and reports pro-
ceeded beyond the Public Service Commission. 
Brief reference to the cases ·and reports will estab-
lish that they are not in any . sense in conflict . with the 
ruling of the Commission in the instant proceeding. ·They 
will be referred to in the order of th·eir ap~p.earance in 
plaintiff's brief. 
Denver & Rio ·Grande Western Railroad Company 
vs. Linck, 56 F. 2d 957; Case No. 1000 before Public 
Utilities ·Commission of Utah, Commission's report · 
dated De.cember 26, 1928: 
Plaintiffs refer to the Denver ~and Rio Grande case, 
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth 
Circuit, and to Case No. 1000 before the Public Utilities 
Commission of Utah, as being the ''same case.'' This 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
staten1ent, however, is not in complete accord with the 
facts. 
One Linck and his associates, in Case No. 1000, 
made application before the Public Utilities Commission 
of Utah for a certificate of convenience· and necessity, 
and, on December 26, 1928, the application was denied, 
the Commission finding that "applicants have been op-
erating for hire, trans1porting freight and express for 
numerous persons; firms .and corporations and appear 
to be in violation of ~Chapter 42, Session Law·s of Utah~ 
19·27, and that such op·erators who violate the provisions 
of the State law should not be rewarded with certificates 
of convenience and necesstiy. '' The report of the Com-
mission, an examination will disclose, is extremely brief, 
and, while it did not specifically find that the applicants 
had, prior to the filing of the a:pplication, wilfully operat-
ed in violation of the law, it did find that they transported 
freight for ''numerous persons, firms and corporations.'' 
Had applicants' operations, prior to the filing of the 
application, not been in wilful violation of the law, and 
had all statutory requirements been met by applicants, 
the a;pplication, we submit, would have been granted. 
Notwithstanding the refusal of the Utah Commis-
sion to grant the application, Linck himself undertook 
to circumvent the law, whieh, the case clearly shows, he 
intended to do, by restricting his operations to 117 con-
signees, who were customers of Scowcroft & Sons Com-
pany, wholesale grocers. The Railroad operated under 
a certificate of convenience and necessity_ into the ter-
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ritory sought to be served by Linck, and, in an action 
filed by it in the Federal Court, prayed for an injunc-
tion. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction, 
and this determination was reaffirmed at the final hear-
ing, with the exception that the trial court refused to 
enjoin the defendant Linck from operating under the 
Scowcroft contract. The Railroad appealed to the Cir-
cuit Court. We quote two paragraphs of the Court's 
opm1on, affirming the granting of the injunction: (1p. 
960.) 
''The Linck operations, subsequent to the p·re-
liminary ·injunction, had been restricted to 117 
consignees, who were customers of Scowcroft & 
Sons Company. This alone is the only element 
which· differentiates . his operations from those 
prior to the issuance of the preliminary injunc-
tion. In all other respects his operations are 
similar. The fact that he ceased to be associated 
.in interest in the operation of trucks with other 
defendants who 1purported to transport freight-
under private contracts is not material. The fact 
that there has been a restriction in the number 
of consignees he serves, or the limitation of the 
consignees to those that are customers of a par-
ticular concern, does not change Linck's opera-
tions from those of a common earrier. See Ter-
minal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252, 36 S. 
Ct. 583, 60 L. Ed. 984, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 7 65. 
''In our opinion, the Scowcroft contract is ~ sub~ 
terfuge employed by Linck for the continuation 
of the business that he was doing illegally. Had 
there been a bona fide contract iand an operation 
thereunder, Linck's operations may not have 
fallen under those·of a common carrier. It is ap-
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parent that the Scowcroft contract, while in form 
a contract for delivery of goods to the customers 
of Scowcroft & Sons Company, is in substance a 
subterfuge by which Linck is to be permitted to 
continue in the operation of autotrucks for the 
transportation of freight in competition with aJp--
pellants, who are the holders of the legal right 
to operate in the particular territory.'' 
Nothing further need be said, we feel, concerning the 
Linck matters. Obviously, both the Commission and the 
Court were dealing with a case of wilful intent to violate 
the law, conclusively est;ablished by the evidence. 
In the Matter of the Application of M. C. West and 
R. A. Nielsen, and the Application of Ry A. Nielsen, M. 
C. West and Jack Miller, Cases Nos. 975 and 985, Public 
Utilities Co1nmission of Utah (June 13, 1928), 11 Utah 
P.U.C.R. 27: 
Here again the Commission found that ''applicants 
have been operating for hire, transporting freight and 
express for nunterous firms"', persons and corporations", 
and again the Commission's report is very brief. It is 
fair to assume, however, in view of the finding that 
applicants had been operating for numerous firms, per-
sons and corporations, a wilful violation was shown. 
In the Matter of the Application of J. L. Coons, 
Q,ase No. 1354, Public Utilities Commission of Utah 
(August 16, 1933}, 16 Utah P.U.•C.R. 205: 
The application in this case was denied for the 
reason "That applicant had for the prior four years 
operated in violation of Chapter 42, Session Laws of 
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Utah, 1929, in that he failed to procure a 1permit before 
commencing operations for more than one person, firm 
or corporation; that he failed to comply with the provi-
sions of Chapter 17, Session Laws of Utah 1925, in that 
he had not filed report covering his operations for hire 
over the highways and paid the taxes thereon. '' On the 
question of failing to pay the taxes, assessable against 
his operation, the Commission's report shows that ap-
plicant stated ''He would be willing to pay the tax on 
his operations provided other operators are required to 
do so.'' While there is no express finding as to whether 
applicant was or was not guilty of wilful intent to violate 
the law, still, we feel it is fair to assume that the Com-
mission was of the opinion that there was evidence of 
that fact. It is hardly believable that had applicant's 
operations been bona fide, that that matter would not 
have been brought to the attention of the Commission. 
It was not for the Commission to prove that applicant's 
operations were bona fide; the burden was on ~rupplicant 
80 to do. 
In the Matter of the A;pplication of Don H. Ander-
son, Case No. 2150, Public Service Commission of Utah 
(iOctober 21, 1:938): 
In this case, in that portion of the report quoted 
by plaintiffs in their brief (page 25), the Commission 
stated that the applicant had testified that he had been 
hauling for some time without authority; that he was 
arrested and fined for such violation in 1937, one year 
prior to the hearing before the Commission; that he was 
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:again apprehended by ins:pectors of the Public Service 
Commission on August 3, 1938, which was prior to the 
.. Commission's hearing, "but that he had not operated in 
violation of the law since August 3, 1938. '' In its find-
ings, _the Commission also found that-
'' It is somewhat doubtful if there is any particu-
lar need for the service. It ·also appears from 
the evidence that the applicant has persisted 
knowingly on. numerous occasions, both before 
and since August 3, 1938, in transporting com-
modities for hire in violation of the laws of this 
state and of the rules and regulations of the 
Commission. * * * '' 
· Little wonder the Commission held that it was not 
consistent with the Motor V-ehicle Act to grant authority 
to a person under such conditions, even though the need 
-of the service 1proposed, and the other determining fac-
tors, were f-avorable to the granting of the application. 
- ·Decision of Public .Service Commission -of New 
York in case of in re. Unauthorized Bus Operations 
_(1.;941) 40 f. U. R. (N_S) 40: 
The portion ·of the holding of this case, quoted by 
plainti:ffis (page 26, their brief), should he sufficient to 
.bring it within the category of the other cases and re-
ports above discussed. The Commission decided that 
''Hereafter no authority will be granted to an operator 
guilty of illegal operation at the time. That all illegal 
operation· must cease and that every applicant must 
come before .the Commission with clean hands and se· 
cure full legal authority to operate before proce·eding." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
53 
Motor Truck Transfer, Inc., v. Southwestern Trans-
portation Company (Dec. 11938} 122 S.IW. 2d 471: 
Plaintiffs' reference to this case is difficult to 
understand. 
Applicant sought to secure renewal of a general 
license to carry on the same type of transportation 
business that it h·ad carried on for several years past. 
Competing carriers intervened, protesting the granting 
of the license. The Commission deniec;I . the applica-
tion, and applicant took an appeal. The. fourth syllabus 
of the opinion is quite sufficient to show the sufficiency 
of the facts established to justify_ the Court in affirm-
ing the judgment: 
''Where motor vehicle, which had been operat-
ing for several years under special ip.ermit, had 
not confined hauling to class of commodities which 
it was licensed to haul, had failed to supply bond 
or insurance contract required by Corporation 
Commission, had failed to file required· tariff and 
had offer~d no excuse for its conduct, Commission 
did not act arbitrarily or abuse its discretion in 
denying license to operate to carrier, notwith-
standing that carrier had made rather heavy· in--
vestments.'' 
If under the circumstances, the· Co!iporation · Com-
mission in the Arkansas case had- in fact granted the 
licens-e, and the p.oin t had been raised that, in so doing, 
it was guilty of an abuse of discretion, we would be 
unable to see ·any escape :_from ~ holding by the Appel-
late ·Court that the point was wen· t~ken, 
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Rowley vs. Public Service Commission, 112 Utah 
11-6, 185 P. 2d 514: 
Here .again it is difficult to understand why ~efer­
ence to this case should be made by plaintiffs. The ap-
plicant filed an :application for a contract carrier permit, 
to operate over all the highways of the State of Utah, 
predicating his right to a permit on the so-called'' grand-
father" clause ·Contained in the first 1paragraph of Sec-
tion 76-5-21, Chapter 105, Laws of Utah 1945. The law 
in question, among other things, provides that-
'' * • * The Commission shall grant on applica-
tion to any applicant who was a contract motor 
carrier as defined by this Act on the 1st day of 
January, 1940, a permit to operate as a contract 
motor carrier on the same highways and to carry 
on . the s·ame type of motor service as he was on 
said date. * * *" 
The application was denied and .applicant appealed. The 
operations on which applicant predicated his right to a 
permit were found to be wholly ill~gal and this Court 
affirmed the order of denial of the Commission. We 
quote the following language, beginning -at the bottom 
of page 128 of the Utah report, which language strongly 
indicates, we venture to say, the evidence of sufficient 
facts to justify a finding of wilful intent to violate the 
law: 
'' * • * Consider the operator who bad complied 
with the law from March 15, 1933, to the 1st day 
of January, 1940. His rights, if any, could rise 
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no higher than those included in his original,per .. 
mit. These permits, of course, require loading 
and discharge points, and limits as to highways. 
All highways were not available for his move-
ments, and all cargo not movable by him. The 
legal operator was restricted by the law, but lack 
of detection ·apparently permitted the applicant 
to roam the state at large. To permit the appli-
cant to carry over all highways, and at the same 
time to restrict legally operating carriers to desig-
nated routes would be to grant a premium for 
illegality. We are convinced. the legislature never 
intended such a result.'' 
In the instant proceeding, applicant did not ground 
its application or right to a contract carrier permit- on 
the grandfather clause, found in the legislative act of 
1945 (first paragraph, Sec. 76-5-21, Chapter 105). Such_ 
reference as was made throughout the testimony at the 
hearing before the Commission, to the fact that Leslie 
Ashton and his three sons, as individuals, partnership~ 
or corporations, had, for a great many years prior to 
the filing of the instant a;p.plication, transported :iner-
chandi,se for the Ashton Mercantile institutions in the 
Uintah Basin, was done to show the needs, nature an..d 
extent of the Ashton operations and also for the very 
purpose of showing the absence of any wilful intent to 
violate the law on the part of those receiving, as well 
as those hauling, the merchandise. Applicant grounded 
its application on the second paragraph of the section 
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fied things : 
1. That the highways over which applicant de-
sires to operate ·are not unduly burdened. 
· 2. That the granting of the application will not 
unduly interfere with the travelling public. 
3. That the granting of the a pp.Iica tion will not 
be detrimental to the best interests of the 
people of the State of Utah and/ or the locali-
ties to be served. 
4. That the existing transportation facilities do 
not provide adequate or reasonable service. 
Each and all of these requirements, as well as the 
absence of wilful intent to viol~ate the law; the Commis-
. sion found, had been met by applicant. And the evidence 
on the question of lack of wilful intent, we submit, was 
ample to justify the affirmative finding of the Commis-
sion and to negative any basis for the contention made 
by counsel for plaintiffs that the Commission ~acted arbi-
trarily in granting a contract carrier permit to applicant. 
Counsel for plaintiffs, after stating their belief that 
there was no ~bowing of inadequacy or unreasonable-
ness in the existing transportation facilities, neverthe-
less conceded that the facts of the instant proceeding 
presented a "borderline case'', and recognized that a 
case had been m~ade, but characterized it as ''very weak.'' 
From page 30 of their brief, we quote the following: 
''In this case, plaintiffs believe there is no 
.showing that existing facilities -are inadequate or 
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unreasonable, and, certainly, the facts here pre-
sent a borderline case. Under a correct under-
standing and application of the law, the .Commis-
sion acted arbitrarily in granting the certificate 
applied for in the face of the wrongful operations 
of the applicant, and the very weak case made on 
adequacy and reasonableness.'' 
Both under the Utah statutes and decisions, if, on 
the question of inadequacy and unreasonableness of 
existing facilities, defendants made or pres-ented even a 
borderline or a very we.ak case, still, we submit, the 
action of the Commission, in granting applicant's rpermit, 
must stand. 
The scope of a review of an order or decision made 
by the Public Service Commission is set forth in Section 
76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated 1943, from which we quote 
the following: 
'' * • * The review shall not be extended further 
than to determine whether the Commission has 
regularly pursued its author~ty, including a de-
termination of whether the order or decision 
under review violates any right of the petitioner 
·under the Constitution of the United States or 
of the State of Utah. The findings and co_nclu-
sions of the Commission on questions of fact 
.shall be final, and ·shall.not be subject to review. 
Such questions of f.act shall include ultima.te 
facts and the fi.ndmgs and conclusions of the 
Commission on reasonableness and discrimina-
tion. * • * '' 
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This Court held, in Utah Light & Traction Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 101 U. 99, 118 P. 2d. '683, 
that-
''The review by this Court, exerc1smg judicial 
functions only, cannot extend beyond_ the ques-
tions as to whether the Commission acted within 
its Constitutional and statutory powers, ·and 
whether its determination and order is supported 
by the evidence and is reasonable and not arbi-
trary.'' 
Also, in !-fulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 
U. 245, 117 P. 2d 298, this Court held: 
"It is not required that the facts found by the 
Commission be conclusively established, nor even 
that they be shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence. If there is in the record competent 
evidence from which a reasonable mind could be-
lieve ·or conclude that a certain fact existed, a 
finding of such facts finds justification in the 
evidence, and we cannot disturb it.'' 
The same doctrine was followed in Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 102 U. 465, 132 P. 2d 
128. 
---0---
We submit that the evidence was sufficient to neg-
ative each of the three points advanced and relied upon 
by plaintiffs in their .appeal from the order of the Com-
mission granting the defendant, Ashton's, Inc., a permit 
to operate, as a contract motor carrier of property for 
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hire, from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Roosevelt and Vernal, 
Utah, and also from Devil's Slide to Roosevelt and Ver-
nal, Utah, serving Leslie Ashton & Sons Company at 
}toosevelt, and Ashton Bros., Inc., and. Ashton Oil & Gas 
Company at Vernal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dated August 31, 1950 
L. C. MONTGOMERY and 
SKEEN,. THURMAN & 
WORSLEY, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
( Resp,ondent), 
Ashton's, Incorporated. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General, 
and 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
(Resp1ondent), 
Public Service Commission. 
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